Numbers

Centene trades at $42 on a $195B revenue base — a 0.11x price-to-sales ratio — because the market is pricing a managed care operator whose razor-thin margins are under simultaneous pressure from Medicaid redetermination membership losses, elevated health benefits ratios (89%+), and a $6.7B goodwill impairment that signals the WellCare acquisition hasn't delivered its promised value. The single metric most likely to rerate or derate this stock is the health benefits ratio: every 100 basis points of HBR improvement on $195B of premium revenue translates to roughly $2B of operating income and $3+ per share of earnings power.

At a Glance

Share Price

$41.82

Market Cap ($B)

20.6

Revenue FY2025 ($B)

194.8

EV/EBITDA (FY2024)

3.3

Forward P/E (2026E)

13.9

Centene is the third-largest managed care organization in the US by revenue, behind UnitedHealth and Cigna. It serves approximately 20 million members, primarily through Medicaid (about 64% of membership), ACA Marketplace (about 28%), and Medicare (about 5%). The stock has fallen 35% from its 52-week high of $64.15. Trailing EPS is -$13.53 due to a $6.7B goodwill impairment taken in Q3 2025; forward consensus for 2026 is $3.01 per share.

Quality Scorecard

Is this a well-run business that will still be around in 10 years?

Altman Z-Score

2.8

Piotroski F (0–9)

7

ROE FY2024 (%)

12.5

Debt/Equity FY2024

2.1

The Altman Z-Score of 2.8 places Centene in the "grey zone" (1.8–3.0) — not in distress, but not safely above the threshold either. This is typical for large MCOs that carry significant long-term debt against thin equity bases. The Piotroski F-Score of 7/9 signals decent fundamental strength despite the FY2025 impairment year. ROE swung from a healthy 12.5% in FY2024 to -33.4% in FY2025 entirely because of the non-cash goodwill write-down, not operational collapse. Debt-to-equity rose from 2.1x to 2.9x as equity shrank by $6.5B from the impairment charge. The balance sheet is stressed but not broken — Centene ended FY2025 with $17.9B in cash against $17.5B of total debt, a near-neutral net debt position.

Revenue and Earnings Power

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Revenue has grown 8.5x in a decade — from $23B in 2015 to $195B in 2025 — driven by the Health Net (2016), Fidelis Care (2018), and WellCare (2020) acquisitions. Operating income appears nearly flat on this scale because MCO margins are structurally thin: Centene earns $1–3B of operating income on $100B+ of revenue. The FY2025 plunge to -$7.6B reflects a $6.7B goodwill impairment; even excluding it, adjusted operating income was approximately -$900M, confirming genuine margin erosion in Medicaid and Marketplace.

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This is the critical chart. Operating margins averaged 2.5–3.5% in the pre-WellCare era (2006–2019), compressed to under 2% post-acquisition (2021–2024), and turned deeply negative in FY2025. Each major acquisition — Health Net in 2016, Fidelis Care in 2018, WellCare in 2020 — was followed by a margin trough as integration costs and lower-margin Medicaid membership diluted profitability. The market's 64% derating from the 2018 peak of $115 directly tracks this margin erosion. Until operating margin sustainably re-crosses 2%, the stock cannot rerate.

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Revenue growth accelerated sharply through 2025, reaching 20%+ YoY in Q2–Q4 despite total membership declining 7.4%. This paradox — shrinking members, surging revenue — reflects premium rate increases that more than offset membership losses. The question is whether these rate hikes keep pace with medical costs (the health benefits ratio suggests they have not).

Cash Generation — Are the Earnings Real?

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Cash conversion is volatile and reveals two anomalies investors must understand. FY2024: OCF collapsed to $154M despite $3.3B of net income — a 95% cash conversion failure caused by a $7B+ working capital swing as Medicaid receivables ballooned by $4.2B and accounts payable dropped by $3.3B. This was driven by government payment timing during Medicaid redeterminations, not earnings quality. FY2025: OCF recovered to $5.1B despite a -$6.7B net loss because the goodwill impairment was entirely non-cash. Over the five-year period FY2020–2024, cumulative OCF ($24.2B) ran 2.3x cumulative net income ($10.4B) — excellent for an MCO, indicating that reported earnings understate cash generation in normal years.

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Free cash flow averaged $3.9B per year over FY2021–2025 (excluding the FY2024 working capital anomaly, it averaged $5.0B). At a current market cap of $20.6B, the 5-year average FCF yield is 19% — remarkably high and suggesting either deep value or a market that expects normalized FCF to be materially lower going forward. Capex intensity is low ($0.6–1.0B per year, under 1% of revenue), typical for managed care which is an asset-light business model.

Capital Allocation

Stock-based compensation runs approximately $200M per year (under 1% of operating cash flow in normal years), which is modest for a company of this scale. Centene does not pay a regular dividend. The company conducted significant share repurchases in 2022 (financing cash outflow of $4.2B, implying roughly $3B+ in buybacks). Total shares outstanding have declined from approximately 550M to 492M over the past four years — a meaningful 11% reduction that offsets SBC dilution and then some. Capital allocation has been acquisition-heavy historically (WellCare alone cost $17.3B in 2020), but the company has shifted to debt reduction and buybacks since 2022.

Balance Sheet Health

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The balance sheet tells a story of acquisition-fueled leverage followed by gradual deleveraging. Long-term debt ballooned from $1.2B (2015) to $18.6B (2021) as Centene financed the WellCare acquisition. Since then, debt has been slowly trimmed to $17.4B. The more striking development: equity dropped from $26.4B (FY2024) to $20.0B (FY2025) due to the goodwill impairment, pushing debt-to-equity from 2.1x to 2.9x. However, Centene ended FY2025 in a net cash position (-$0.3B net debt) thanks to $17.9B in cash against $17.5B in total borrowings. For a company with negative reported earnings, the liquidity position is unexpectedly strong.

Valuation — CNC vs Its Own History

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The stock peaked at $115 in late 2018, just before the WellCare acquisition announcement. Since then, revenue has more than tripled from $60B to $195B, but the stock has lost 64% of its value. The market has relentlessly derated Centene as each acquisition brought in lower-margin Medicaid lives without demonstrating margin expansion. At $42, the implied price-to-sales ratio of 0.11x is the lowest in the company's publicly traded history and the lowest among large-cap managed care peers.

Price/Sales (TTM)

0.11

EV/EBITDA (FY2024)

3.3

Forward P/E (2026E)

13.9

Analyst Target ($)

$43.47

On FY2024 clean earnings, CNC trades at 3.3x EV/EBITDA versus a managed care industry median of 10–11x. The forward P/E of 13.9x on consensus 2026 EPS of $3.01 is roughly in line with Cigna (12x) but well below UnitedHealth (27x) and Elevance (15x). The stock currently sits 4% below the consensus analyst target of $43.47 (range: $32–$70), suggesting the market is pricing the base case with near-zero margin of safety.

Peer Comparison

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CNC's P/E is not shown because trailing EPS is -$13.53 (impairment-driven); forward P/E is approximately 14x on 2026 consensus. CNC operating margin shown is FY2024 (last clean year); peers are FY2025.

The valuation gap between CNC (0.11x P/S) and UNH (0.72x P/S) is the widest in managed care and reflects a fundamental quality divide: UNH demonstrates consistent 4%+ operating margins and diversified revenue streams (Optum), while CNC has never sustained margins above 3% and is concentrated in government-sponsored programs with politically sensitive reimbursement rates. The peer most analogous to CNC is Humana — both are Medicaid/Medicare-heavy, both are struggling with elevated HBRs, and both trade at steep discounts to the diversified players. Molina, despite similar margins, commands a higher P/S due to its smaller, more focused Medicaid-only model.

Fair Value and Scenario Analysis

Bear Case

$28

Base Case

$45

Bull Case

$75

Bear ($28): Health benefits ratio stays above 89% through 2026, Medicaid membership declines 10%+ as redeterminations continue, 2026 EPS comes in under $2. At 12x trough earnings, the stock falls to the mid-$20s. This scenario assumes managed care repricing risk is structural, not cyclical.

Base ($45): HBR normalizes toward 88% by H2 2026, total membership decline slows to 5%, and CNC delivers approximately $3 EPS as guided. At 14–15x normalized earnings, the stock drifts toward the mid-$40s — roughly where consensus already sits. This is the "muddling through" scenario.

Bull ($75): HBR returns to 87%, Marketplace losses from 2025 are fully corrected, and operating leverage on a $195B revenue base delivers $5–6 EPS (approaching FY2024 levels). At 13–15x earnings, the stock re-rates to $65–$90. This requires margin recovery to 2%+ operating, which Centene achieved as recently as FY2024 but has not sustained post-WellCare.

The 5-year average free cash flow of $3.9B implies a 19% FCF yield at the current market cap — a valuation that either reflects deep value or a structural discount the market is unlikely to unwind until margin stability is demonstrated over multiple quarters.


The numbers confirm that Centene is a revenue machine generating real operating cash flow ($5B+ in normal years) at the cheapest valuation in large-cap managed care (0.11x P/S, 3.3x FY2024 EV/EBITDA), and that it ended FY2025 in a net cash position despite the impairment. The numbers contradict two popular narratives at once: the "just a one-time charge" story rings hollow because even excluding the impairment, FY2025 operating income was negative $900M — the business genuinely deteriorated; but the "CNC is broken" story also overstates the case, since operating cash flow recovered to $5.1B in FY2025 and the balance sheet is not under stress. Watch Q1 2026 earnings on April 28 and the health benefits ratio — if HBR prints under 89%, the $3/share consensus for 2026 is achievable and the stock re-rates toward $50; if it prints above 90%, the recovery thesis unravels and the bear case comes into focus.